National policies towards sovereign wealth funds in Europe: a comparison of France, Germany and Italy by Thatcher, Mark
Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and 
Globalisation in the Gulf States
National policies towards 
sovereign wealth funds in 
Europe: A comparison of 
France, Germany and Italy
Mark Thatcher
April 2013
Policy Brief number 2
The Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and 
Globalisation in the Gulf States is a ten-year multidisciplinary 
global research programme. It focuses on topics such as 
globalization and the repositioning of the Gulf States in the global 
order, capital flows, and patterns of trade; specific challenges 
facing carbon-rich and resource-rich economic development; 
diversification, educational and human capital development into 
post-oil political economies; and the future of regional security 
structures in the post-Arab Spring environment.  
 
The Programme is based in the LSE Department of Government 
and led by Professor Danny Quah and Dr Kristian Coates 
Ulrichsen. The Programme produces an acclaimed working paper 
series featuring cutting-edge original research on the Gulf, 
published an edited volume of essays in 2011, supports post-
doctoral researchers and PhD students, and develops academic 
networks between LSE and Gulf institutions.  
 
At the LSE, the Programme organizes a monthly seminar series, 
invitational breakfast briefings, and occasional public lectures, and 
is committed to five major biennial international conferences. The 
first two conferences took place in Kuwait City in 2009 and 2011, 
on the themes of Globalisation and the Gulf, and The Economic 
Transformation of the Gulf.  
 
The Programme is funded by the Kuwait Foundation for the 
Advancement of Sciences.  
 
www.lse.ac.uk/LSEKP/  
National Policies Towards Sovereign Wealth Funds in Europe: A Comparison of 
France, Germany and Italy 
  
Policy Brief, Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and 
Globalisation in the Gulf States  
 
Mark Thatcher 
Professor of Comparative and International Politics 
Department of Government 
London School of Economics 
m.thatcher@lse.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © Mark Thatcher 2013 
The right of Mark Thatcher to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted in 
accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. 
Published in 2013. 
All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purposes of criticism 
and review, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or 
transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or 
otherwise, without the prior permission of Mark Thatcher. The views and opinions expressed 
in this publication are those of the author and not necessarily those of London School of 
Economics and Political Science (LSE) or the Kuwait Programme on Development, 
Governance and Globalisation in the Gulf States. Neither Mark Thatcher nor LSE accepts any 
liability for loss or damage incurred as a result of the use of or reliance on the content of this 
publication. 
National Policies Towards Sovereign Wealth Funds in Europe:  
A Comparison of France, Germany and Italy 
MARK THATCHER 
Abstract 
Although France, Germany and Italy are often seen as relatively closed to foreign equity 
investment, a closer analysis shows that they have often accepted or even welcomed 
sovereign wealth fund (SWF) investments. In all three countries, there were debates 
about how to respond to SWFs. But despite initial concerns, there has been considerable 
support for allowing and attracting SWFs. All three countries have passed legislation 
regulating foreign equity investment, but the provisions remain limited, as much 
directed against private equity investors as against SWFs, and have almost never been 
used. Moreover, SWF investments in individual companies have almost always been 
welcomed and sometimes actively sought by firm managers and policy makers, 
including in sensitive and high-profile firms. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
France, Germany and Italy have a popular reputation of being relatively closed to outside 
equity investment by factors such as their language, legal restrictions, state ‘intervention’ and 
a culture of hostility to outside ownership of national companies. Thus, for instance, the 
World Bank’s ranking of economies for ‘ease of doing business’ put Germany as 20th, France 
as 34th and Italy as 73rd, compared with the UK as 7th and the US as 4th, in its 2012 survey 
(World Bank 2012). Academically too, studies point to several factors that might act as 
obstacles to sovereign wealth fund (SWF) investment. France is often categorized as a ‘statist’ 
economy, in which the state plays a dominant role, notably supporting the firms of French 
‘national champions’, providing finance for firms and leading decisions about mergers and 
cross-holdings, including of privately owned companies. Germany is often seen as a 
coordinated or corporatist market economy, where representatives of firms and employees 
cooperate closely, firms rely on earnings and bank finance for investment, and firms are either 
privately owned or protected by powerful long-term bank owners of their shares (Schmidt 
2003; Hall and Soskice 2001). Italy is often argued to be a mixed market or statist economy, 
but one with a weak state and heavily reliant on personal and political connections. In all three 
cases, the economies are seen as relatively closed to outside equity investors. Hence initial  
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expectations are that the three countries are likely to be relatively resistant or even hostile to 
equity investment by SWFs, especially those from non-Western countries. 
 This policy brief, however, suggests a somewhat different picture. It argues that 
although political debates were initially hostile to SWF equity investment, this has rapidly 
changed. Moreover, some of the opposition related more to overseas investors in general 
rather than SWFs specifically. In line with this, although all three countries placed new legal 
restrictions on equity investment in the 2000s, these were in fact rather limited and were not 
specifically targeted against SWFs. Moreover, although numbers of non-Western SWF 
investments remained limited (compared, for instance, to those in the UK), governments in the 
three countries increasingly welcomed SWFs and indeed actively sought their investments. 
2. FRANCE  
French policies towards foreign equity investment are complex, as the role of the state and the 
openness to such investment have changed.
1
 Traditionally, French companies were closed to 
foreign investment. The larger ones were wholly or partially publicly owned directly or 
indirectly via state-owned banks and financial bodies. Others were majority-owned by 
families. In any case, firms relied largely on the state for investment capital, rather than on 
equity capital. Moreover, foreign investment required government approval and the stock 
market was small. In so far as companies were privately owned, they were often protected by 
cross-shareholdings. There has been a long tradition of fear of large overseas firms, especially 
privately owned US ones, which were seen as dangerous competitors to French firms, and 
policies of creating national or ‘international’ French champion firms (e.g. Servan-Schreiber 
1967; Hayward 1995). 
 However, from the mid-1980s onwards, this position began to change. Many state-
owned companies were privatized. The stock market grew, while state-provided finance 
declined. European Union law prohibited many restrictions on investment from firms 
established in other EU member states (including non-EU firms that created subsidiaries), 
notably ‘golden shares’ or administrative obligations on investors from other EU member 
states. Stable cross-holdings of shares began to weaken (Culpepper 2005). After 2002, the 
establishment of the Euro appeared to aid cross-border investment. Indeed, policies towards 
foreign direct investment (FDI) changed as France began actively to seek such investment. 
                                                          
1
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 French policies towards SWFs in the 2000s reflect both the statist inheritance and 
more recent alterations in the role of the state, resulting in conflicting rhetoric. One strand of 
political debate has focused on the dangers of overseas takeovers of French firms. The most 
prominent example was the rumoured attempt by Pepsi to buy the French food firm Danone in 
2005, which was met with calls for ‘economic patriotism’ (Clift and Woll 2012). Parts of the 
nationalistic right also began to attack overseas equity purchases, including those by SWFs. 
Moreover, France created its own SWF in 2008, the Fonds Stratégique d’Investissement (FSI), 
designed to invest in French firms. One explicit reason for its creation, given both by the then 
president Nicolas Sarkozy and in parliamentary debates, was to prevent SWFs from buying 
French firms ‘too cheaply’.  
 At the same time, French policy makers have sought to attract SWF investment. There 
have been repeated visits by senior French officials to selected countries and contacts with 
SWFs. The best known concerns Qatar, where President Sarkozy went several times during 
his presidency and indeed afterwards. A report by the Sénat on Gulf SWFs called for France to 
play a greater role in the recycling of excess petrodollars and to become a ‘privileged partner’ 
of Gulf states (Sénat 2007: 44–5). Moreover, in a remarkable volte-face given the rhetoric at 
its creation, the FSI began to cooperate closely with SWFs in joint investments. Equally, large 
firms also developed close contacts with SWFs, often in cooperation with state officials. They 
sought SWF investment as well as joint ventures and orders from the SWF host state. 
Examples included Areva, which sought orders for nuclear power stations from Qatar and 
other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states whilst also discussing the QIA (Qatar 
Investment Authority) and KIA (Kuwait Investment Authority) taking limited stakes, and the 
European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS, mostly Franco-German), which 
has sought defence orders as well as investment from Qatar. 
 The complex French policy is reflected in the legal structure for SWF equity 
investment. In 2005 France introduced legislation (in the form of a government decree) 
designed to ensure state controls over foreign equity investments.
2
 Previous legislation in 
2003 had been ruled illegal by the European Court of Justice because its definition of foreign 
investment was too broad, but then Pepsi’s rumoured takeover of Danone had raised political 
controversy. Important parts of the legislation applied to non-EU bodies taking control, 
defined as control of over one third of shares or voting rights investments, of French firms 
(based on the headquarters of the firm). It covered certain sectors, notably related to security, 
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information and communication technologies, and defence. Such investments require 
government authorization. Equally, the decree introduced restrictions on investment by EU 
firms, which it could block on certain grounds, notably danger of criminal acts or threats to 
industrial and research and development capacities, security of supply in crucial industries or 
dangers to defence and national security.
3
  
 While the decree has attracted much attention, the use of its powers in practice has 
been very limited. Indeed, the research has found no instances in which they have been 
applied. On the contrary, the government, public bodies and state-owned firms have actively 
engaged in cooperation with SWFs. Thus, for instance, in 2009 the FSI signed an agreement 
of intent with Mubadal, an Abu Dhabi SWF. Equally, the publicly owned Caisse des Dépôts et 
Consignations, the main state investment bank, created joint funds or partnerships with the 
Chinese Development Bank and then in 2012 with the QIA. Moreover, a very high-profile 
(although limited in size) investment by the QIA in French suburbs was announced. 
 Although the number of SWF equity investments is lower than for the UK (Thatcher 
2012), it remains significant and, perhaps of greatest importance, SWFs have made 
acquisitions in major French firms that have been welcomed and sometimes actively 
encouraged by the firms themselves as well as the government. These investments include 
firms in strategic sectors. The most numerous and significant have been by the QIA. Two 
important examples in defence and high technology were Lagardère and EADS, both very 
strategic firms. Another was Veolia, whose head, Henri Proglio, then became head of 
Électricité de France (EDF). Dubai International Capital also bought a stake in EADS in 2007. 
However, the French welcome to SWF equity investment has also extended to China; for 
instance, the China Investment Corporation (CIC) has bought shares in GDF Suez, which is 
majority state-owned, as well as the financial company Dexia.  
3. GERMANY 
German companies were traditionally closed to foreign equity investment. The major reason is 
that very few firms were public companies with shares quoted on stock markets; indeed, there 
were only 450 listed on the exchanges in 1982, a lower number than in the 1950s (Story 
1997). German companies obtained finance from banks and/or their retained profits. 
Moreover, a system of cross-shareholdings and especially ownership of shares by banks kept 
stock markets very small. Suppliers in the utility sectors were usually publicly owned.  
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 However, this situation began to change in the 1990s and especially the 2000s. A 
determined policy of developing financial markets, including the stock markets, was 
undertaken. Bank and cross-shareholdings diminished. Major utility companies, especially in 
telecommunications and energy, were privatized. Hence the German equity market became 
considerably more open to foreign purchases. 
 In this context, the rise of SWFs as well as other large foreign investors in the 2000s 
was met with concern in Germany. There were worries about the entry of short-term 
‘speculative’ investors, who stood in contrast to long-term relationships built up between 
German banks and firms through cross-shareholdings, long-term loans and seats on company 
boards. In 2005, Franz Müntefering, chairman of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), attacked 
foreign private equity firms as ‘swarms of locusts that fall on companies, stripping them bare 
before moving on’. A second fear was ‘state capitalism’, in which SWFs from countries that 
were not open themselves to foreign investment would take over German companies and then 
use their holdings for political purposes.  
 Senior politicians and policy makers called for protection against FDI, especially from 
outside the EU. Several suggestions were debated in 2005–8, notably by Peer Steinbrück 
(SPD), then the federal finance minister. One was registration and authorization of non-EU 
investments in German firms. Another was a list of sectors to be protected, notably strategic 
sectors such as energy and telecommunications. A further proposal was that a German SWF 
should be set up, to take stakes in major German firms.  
 Yet despite the concerns about SWFs, there was also strong support for keeping 
Germany equity markets open and indeed sometimes for welcoming SWFs. For a start, many 
of the fears were focused on certain countries, notably Russia and to a lesser extent China, 
rather than others. It is noteworthy that German politicians and certain large firms welcomed 
and indeed sought investment from SWFs in the Gulf, notably Kuwait and Dubai. A second 
factor is that calls for protectionism were countered by arguments that openness to foreign 
investment benefited Germany. Key policy makers, such as the ‘liberal’ Free Democratic 
Party (FDP) or major business associations (e.g. the German Association of Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry) and banks, actively supported ‘liberal’ economic policies of 
openness. A further point is that attacks (for instance, Müntefering’s comments about 
‘locusts’) concerned private equity investors, including from the US, as much as or more than 
SWFs, on grounds of their short-termism rather than foreign ownership.  
 Legislative changes, policies and individual investments reflected these contrasting 
positions. After much debate, in 2009, an amendment was passed to the Foreign Investment 
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Act, the Dreizehntes Gesetz zur Änderung des Außenwirtschaftsgesetzes und der 
Außenwirtschaftsverordnung.
4
 It gave powers to the Federal Economics Ministry (formally 
the Ministry of Economics and Technology) to verify whether a stake of 25 per cent or above 
taken by a non-EU investor in a German company posed a threat to public order or security. If 
the Ministry finds that it does, it can impose conditions on the purchase or prohibit it. 
However, its scope for controlling SWFs is in fact rather limited. For a start, few SWFs take 
25 per cent stakes: almost all have been lower. Second, the Ministry is not obliged to 
undertake an investigation. Third, firms can apply for a ‘certificate of non-harm’ which 
protects them against any action under the law. Fourth, the Economics Ministry needs the 
consent of other ministries to act: decisions are made by the federal government. Finally, there 
are strict time limits: the Ministry must start its investigation within three months of the share 
purchase and then complete it within a further two months. After this period, the SWF 
investment is deemed accepted by default. 
 While German legislative restrictions on non-EU share purchases were slightly 
tightened, German policies towards SWFs became increasingly positive. This began before the 
2007/8 financial crisis, but accelerated thereafter. Thus even supporters of restrictions on 
foreign investors, such as Steinbrück, argued that SWFs were welcome (Handelsblatt, 21 May 
2008). Other ministers argued that interventions under the 2009 law would be very rare and 
that SWFs, even from China, were very welcome.
5
 Several ministers travelled abroad, notably 
to the Gulf as well as China, underlining that their SWFs were welcome.
6
 The research has not 
found any cases in which the 2009 law has been used against SWF equity purchases. 
 Indeed, SWFs, especially from the Gulf, have made significant investments in major 
German firms, and other further attempts to attract SWFs have been seriously discussed. On 
almost all occasions, the investment was welcomed and sometimes was actively sought by the 
firm’s management and/or senior policy makers. Thus, for instance, the KIA had held a stake 
in Daimler since the 1970s, and in 2001 was reported to be its largest shareholder, with 7 per 
cent of shares; it is noteworthy that it did not have a member on the supervisory board. 
Daimler also welcomed purchases by Dubai Holdings in 2005 (reportedly 2 per cent, sold in 
2009), as well as by the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA; initially a 9 per cent holding 
in 2009 but then reduced to 3 per cent). The QIA was also welcomed into Porsch and 
Volkwsagen. Other companies such as Siemens or the publicly owned railway Deutsche Bahn 
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5
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6
 For instance, Glos, von Guttenberg and even Steinbrück. 
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began to look for SWF investors, notably from the Middle East. Sometimes SWFs were 
welcomed as a protection against hostile takeovers (e.g. Siemens or Hochtief). At other times 
they were also seen as a valuable source of capital and long-term investors. Finally, share 
purchases by SWFs were sometimes seen as a means of entering the SWF’s home market.  
 Several of the firms cited are large and politically and nationally prominent. However, 
in aggregate, the number of significant investments remains small. Equally, SWFs have 
almost always taken limited stakes rather than majority ones. This however, does not mean 
that they were insignificant: at times, stakes of 6–7 per cent are the largest ones in the 
company.  
4. ITALY 
Traditionally, Italian stock exchanges were tiny compared with those of London or New York, 
or indeed relative to the size of the economy. Italy had few large firms, with much of the 
economy in the hands of small to medium-sized companies. Family ownership was high. Even 
large firms were owned by families or by the state, which directly or indirectly owned a very 
large proportion of the commercial sector, notably through holding companies such as the 
Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale (IRI). Thus there was little scope for foreign equity 
investment. 
 However, from the 1990s onwards, the position gradually began to change. The 
government pursued active policies to develop the Italian stock exchange. There were 
international and competitive pressures to develop larger Italian companies. Capital was 
sometimes in short supply. Economic growth had also been very low, increasing pressure to 
attract overseas investment. 
 In the 2000s there was significant debate about whether Italy should welcome SWFs or 
be wary of them. Leading politicians, including the then prime minister Silvio Berlusconi and 
finance minister Giulio Tremonti, in 2008 expressed their concerns about SWF entry, as did 
on a few specific occasions their allies, the Lega Nord (notably in relation to a bank based in 
Northern Italy, Unicredit). They sought to strengthen defences against SWF equity purchases 
greatly. However, other politicians, such as the then foreign minister Franco Frattini, opposed 
altering the regulatory framework against SWFs, while many business leaders welcomed 
SWFs, notably from Libya. Moreover, the acceptance of SWFs grew after the financial crisis 
of 2007/8, as the positions of opponents changed sharply, including that of Berlusconi and 
Tremonti (see below). Under Mario Monti, the government actively sought SWF investment, 
including that from Gulf countries and China. 
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 The regulatory framework reflects the changing pressures on Italy, both from the EU 
and internally. General Italian law, notably legislation passed in 1994 (Legge no. 474/1994), 
provided for the possibility of limits on shareholdings or at least voting rights in companies 
and sometimes for state special powers, especially in strategic industries, for shareholdings 
above 5 per cent. These restrictions were challenged by the European Commission and 
modified. Moreover, stakes of 3 per cent had to be notified to the stock exchange regulator, 
the Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa (CONSOB). However, in 2008, there 
were discussions on restrictions specifically aimed at SWFs. One small political party, Italia 
dei Valori, which focuses on corruption and was then allied with the left, put forward a 
proposed law in the Senate suggesting an absolute limit of 20 per cent on the share that SWFs 
could own in Italian strategic companies. The main argument was that transparency was 
insufficient and hence limits to investments in strategic companies were necessary. But the 
proposal was not debated in parliament. In 2008, Berlusconi and Tremonti talked of a 5 per 
cent cap on SWF share ownership in strategic companies, but their views were opposed by 
Frattini, who argued that it was unnecessary; and indeed no law was passed. On the contrary, 
Berlusconi and Tremonti changed tack and began to welcome SWFs publicly. 
 In 2012, legislation was introduced that modified state powers concerning equity 
investments in selected sectors.
7
 It did not refer specifically to SWFs. It covered the defence 
sector, where, if the government identified a ‘serious threat’ to defence and security, it could 
block the acquisitions of shares, as well as company decisions, or impose conditions on 
matters such as security of supply or exports of information and transfer of technology. Then 
in certain other strategic industries – energy, transport and telecommunications – it could 
block or impose conditions on non-EU buyers of shares in ‘exceptional cases of risk’ to the 
security and functioning of networks and continuity of supply, as well as blocking certain 
company decisions.  
 Yet while debates grew about foreign investment in strategic Italian firms, at the level 
of individual companies some SWFs have been welcomed or at least accepted for decades. In 
particular, Italy has had long links with Libya. As early as 1976, the Libyan Arab Foreign 
Investment Company (Lafico, which later became part of the Libyan Investment Authority, 
LIA) bought a stake in Fiat, as the company needed liquidity; the stake was substantial, 
reaching 15 per cent by the 1980s. This was done and accepted by the government despite 
Libya’s being ruled by Colonel Gaddafi and also despite rumoured US displeasure. The LIA 
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sold the stake at a considerable profit in 1986. However, the 2000s saw the return of the LIA, 
not just to Fiat but across several firms. It and/or the Libyan central bank bought a share in 
Fiat of 2 per cent, in banks (Banca di Roma, Unicredit and Capitalia), in energy companies 
(the largest gas supplier, ENI, which had been partially privatized) and in Finmeccanica, the 
large defence and aerospace conglomerate, with which the LIA signed a memorandum of 
understanding for a joint venture in 2009. ADIA too made purchases in banks (Banca di 
Roma, Banca Populare Commercio e Industria). It is also reported as having bought a stake in 
Mediaset, the media group owned by Berlusconi, who has been Italian prime minister on 
several occasions. Other SWFs were less active but purchases were made by the Government 
of Singapore Investment Corporation, while there were discussions of possible purchases by 
the CIC.  
 SWF investment in individual companies has almost always been welcomed. Indeed, 
often it has been sought by the management of companies: prominent examples include the 
Agnelli family for Fiat in 1976 or Geronzi for Unicredit. One reason for the welcome has been 
that SWFs have provided valuable capital to owners or to the companies at times of 
recapitalization. Another is that SWF interest has often been followed by rises in share prices. 
A further factor is that usually SWFs have been allies of existing managers, both in terms of 
vote and on the rare occasions when they have had representatives on the board. Indeed, they 
have occasionally been seen as barriers to hostile takeovers – for instance, in the case of 
Libyan stakes in Unicredit. 
 The number of SWF shareholdings in Italy is much smaller than in the UK. However, 
they include strategic firms, notably banks and Fiat, as well as small but well-known 
companies such as Juventus. Moreover, while the stakes are limited, they are often significant 
given that shareholdings can be fragmented. Thus, for instance, the joint stakes of the LIA and 
the Libyan central bank in Unicredit, one of Italy’s largest banks and a large international 
Italian company, in 2010 made them the largest shareholders.  
5. CONCLUSION 
In France, Germany and Italy, SWF equity investments led to political debate about how 
policy makers should respond. Concerns and sometimes opposition to SWFs taking shares in 
major national companies were expressed. Yet the striking feature is that there was strong 
support for allowing SWFs to buy shares freely. Indeed, policy makers usually actively sought 
SWFs. Legislation remained very limited, with almost no specific provisions for SWFs or 
10 
 
restrictions on their investments. Rather, on occasion, greater opposition to private equity 
firms, especially from the US, was expressed than to SWFs. 
 The number of non-Western SWF equity investments remains small compared, for 
instance, with that in the UK. Equally, most SWF stakes were limited and they have almost 
never been a majority or even a controlling minority, say 25–30 per cent. Nevertheless, they 
have been significant at times, especially when share ownership is very dispersed, which 
makes even stakes of 5–10 per cent important for control. Above all, they have involved major 
national companies, sometimes in very sensitive sectors such as high technology, nuclear 
energy and even defence. This indicates the extent to which European countries have 
remained open to SWF equity investment, contrary to popular views and academic 
expectations based on traditional views of these economies.  
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